Yemeni naval forces destroy three explosive-laden Houthi boats in the Red Sea

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Yemeni naval and coastguard units destroyed three explosive-laden boats operated by the Houthi movement in the Red Sea, according to a Yemeni military source, in the latest of a series of engagements along the country’s western coast.

The account given by the source describes an engagement that began with a single vessel and expanded as other boats moved in. Naval units first identified and struck a craft that the military said had been fitted out to launch drones, killing the militiamen aboard. Two further boats then approached the wreck, apparently to recover the crew. Yemeni forces engaged both, and the military said both were also rigged with explosives.

The Yemeni government presents such operations as evidence that the threat to Red Sea shipping originates inside Yemeni waters and cannot be addressed by international naval patrols alone. Independent verification of the specific engagement has not been possible, and the details above rest on the military’s own account. The broader pattern, however, has been reported by several outlets over the past fortnight.

On 7 August, forces on the Red Sea coast said naval patrols detected a boat moving at speed towards a restricted area near the Mokha power station and destroyed it before it reached an oil tanker. Three days later, on 10 August, the coastguard said it intercepted an uncrewed explosive boat heading for the commercial pier of Mokha port in Taiz governorate. Mokha, a small port city on the Bab al-Mandab approaches, has become a focal point for this kind of confrontation because it sits close to both the shipping lane and the front line.

Uncrewed surface vessels have become one of the more difficult problems facing anyone trying to protect traffic through the strait. A small fibreglass hull loaded with explosives is cheap, hard to detect against sea clutter, and can be launched from an unremarkable stretch of coastline. Fitting one to carry or launch a drone extends its reach further still. Warships escorting merchant traffic can defend against missiles and aircraft, but a low, slow boat approaching a vessel at anchor or alongside a pier presents a different and more awkward set of problems.

The stakes were underlined on 11 August, when a small cargo vessel was struck off Yemen’s coast in the Bab al-Mandab area. Yemeni coastguard officials said six people were killed, a toll that included crew members and rescuers who had gone to their assistance. Reports of the incident identified several of the dead as Pakistani nationals and one as Indonesian.

The Bab al-Mandab strait is roughly 18 miles across at its narrowest point and forms the southern gateway to the Red Sea and, beyond it, the Suez Canal. Before the current disruption, a substantial share of global container traffic and a significant volume of seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas moved through it. Sustained attacks have pushed many operators onto the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, adding roughly ten days and considerable fuel cost to each voyage between Asia and northern Europe.

For Yemen itself the consequences are more immediate. The country imports the overwhelming majority of its food and fuel by sea, and higher freight rates and war-risk insurance premiums feed straight into market prices. Aid agencies working in Yemen have repeatedly warned that shipping disruption raises the cost of delivering assistance at the same time as it raises the cost of the goods that assistance is meant to replace.

The Houthis, who control Sanaa and much of Yemen’s north-west, began attacking vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in late 2023, framing the campaign as a response to the war in Gaza. They have been widely reported to receive weapons and technical support from Iran, an allegation Tehran denies. Whatever the supply arrangements, the group’s capacity to strike at sea has expanded considerably, and its arsenal now spans anti-ship missiles, one-way attack drones and uncrewed boats.

Yemeni government naval capability is modest by comparison with the international task forces operating in the same waters, and much of the coastal defence effort has been carried out by forces on the west coast rather than by a conventional navy. Those units have received training and materiel support from members of the Saudi-led coalition. Their claimed successes are difficult to audit, but the frequency of reported interceptions near Mokha suggests a sustained level of activity along that stretch of coast.

What none of these engagements resolve is the underlying political stalemate. United Nations mediation has not produced a durable settlement, and each interception is a tactical event within a conflict that has run for more than a decade. Government officials argue that the maritime campaign will continue as long as the group calculates that it costs little; Houthi representatives have tied any de-escalation to wider regional conditions and to restrictions on Yemeni ports and Sanaa airport.

For merchant crews still transiting the strait, the calculation is narrower and more urgent. Each report of a destroyed explosive boat is one attack that did not reach a ship. The events of 11 August are a reminder of what happens when one does.