Yemen Herald News 
The national security and strategic interests are the determining factors of the specific politics pursued by any given country in the world. However, it can be said that both the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have adopted for themselves regional and international roles, defined the geopolitical dimensions of their national security, and developed strategies and plans to strengthen their regional and global presence in ways that serve their political, economic, and security interests. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, of course, relies solely on financial power as its plan, strategy, role, and concept of national security. Its policies and roles are driven by the personal moods of its politicians, rulers, and decision-makers.
We find that the UAE has precisely identified the threat to its national security, declared it openly, and is actively combating it before the entire world. This threat is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood. Wherever the Brotherhood or its affiliates exist, the UAE perceives a threat to its security. Accordingly, the UAE moved quickly to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood domestically and designated it as a terrorist organization. It then expanded its efforts regionally, beginning with Egypt, where it played a key role in planning, supporting, and backing the Tamarod “Rebel” movement and the June 30 revolution. It supported Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in rescuing Egypt from the grip of the Muslim Brotherhood. It also fought the Brotherhood in Libya by supporting Khalifa Haftar, managing—alongside Sisi—to save half of Libya from their control. Similarly, it opposed the Brotherhood in Yemen by supporting Aidarus al-Zubaidi and Tariq Saleh, and was close to saving two-thirds of Yemen from their influence. It has also worked against them in Sudan by backing the Rapid Support Forces.
Furthermore, the UAE supports the Republic of Somaliland in its confrontation with the federal government, which is largely composed of parties and movements affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE also maintains military bases in Djibouti and Somaliland, as well as logistical and training military presence in Libya, and previously had a similar presence in Yemen before the events of last December.
In any case, whether one agrees or disagrees with the UAE, one cannot blame it or reproach it for identifying the threats to its national security. Identifying these threats and selecting the ways to confront them is the UAE’s concern and its indisputable right. Under any circumstances, one can only admire the clarity and decisiveness of its policies.
Similarly, Qatar has adopted a regional and international role for itself, developing plans to enhance it. Nonetheless, in sharp contrast to the UAE, Qatar has adopted the Muslim Brotherhood as a tool to carry out its political agenda and has used Al Jazeera as a platform to support Brotherhood movements across various countries. Through this approach, Qatar managed to consolidate its influence in countries affected by the so-called Arab Spring uprisings, in which the Brotherhood played a leading role. It secured footholds in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and more recently Syria, where the Emir of Qatar has recently mediated efforts to lift U.S. sanctions on the country and its president. During the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi, Qatar achieved significant economic gains. Negotiations had reached advanced stages regarding the privatization of the Suez Canal and granting Qatar operational rights over it. Naturally, no one can blame Qatar for defining its objectives and roles or deny its right to pursue its interests.
Turning to Saudi Arabia, it neither realized nor understood that its strategic depth extends to include such territories as the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, North and Northeast Africa, encompassing the entire Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. In contrast, both the UAE and Qatar had recognized—even before the Arab Spring—that these regions constituted their strategic depth and formed essential elements of their national security. It involved them finding a foothold in these areas and ensuring the presence of allied regimes there, or at least governments maintaining good relations with them. For this reason, the UAE established bases in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Djibouti and Somalia, to secure maritime routes vital to its economy. Both the UAE and Qatar also have substantial investments in Ethiopia, where Qatar played a key role in financing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
While the UAE exerts efforts to rescue Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood, saved half of Libya, parts of Somalia and Sudan, and nearly two-thirds of Yemen from what is described as this dangerous movement, Saudi Arabia, by contrast, lost all these countries due to personal disputes with their leaders or conflicts between Saudi ambassadors and those governments. Saudi Arabia lost Yemen in 2011; instead of supporting the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, it supported the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to his resignation and effectively handing Yemen over to the Houthis and, by extension, Iran.
Saudi Arabia also failed to support President Hosni Mubarak, which contributed to Egypt falling into the hands of the Brotherhood and, consequently, Turkey. The same pattern occurred in Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Somalia, all of which Saudi Arabia left vulnerable to Brotherhood influence. When the UAE undertook efforts to combat the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia either supported the group or, at best, left the UAE to face them alone. When the UAE was close to containing the Brotherhood in southern Yemen, Saudi Arabia intervened to rescue them and even went further by confronting the UAE on their behalf. Instead of supporting UAE efforts in Somaliland to maintain a balance of power within Somalia, Saudi Arabia supported the government in Mogadishu, which maintains strong ties with Erdoğan and has granted him military bases. As is well known, Erdoğan does not support non-Islamist regimes.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Saudi national security policy is its positioning of the UAE as a threat. This reflects either a lack of awareness or the influence of an underlying ideological alignment shaped by decades of religious indoctrination that intersects with Muslim Brotherhood thought. In reality, the UAE is acting to preserve Saudi national security. Opposing the UAE—directly or indirectly—in areas where it seeks to contain the Brotherhood effectively strengthens that group and may ultimately lead to destabilizing Saudi Arabia itself. Notably, while the United States has designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan, Saudi Arabia, somewhat paradoxically and seemingly in opposition to the UAE, has used its influence to ensure that the Brotherhood in Yemen is excluded from such classification.
In conclusion, one must ask whether Saudi Arabia truly possesses a coherent foreign policy, strategic depth, and national security doctrine. It is difficult to argue that it does, so long as it aligns itself with a group widely considered a terrorist organization against a neighboring state like the United Arab Emirates—a country with a distinctive and influential economic, political, security, and developmental model.
Dr. Sadek Al-Salemi,
Editorial Manager
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